

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 /026 W

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P 141812Z JUN 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0855

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 09033

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 14, 1978

- (SALT TWO-1783)

1. BEGIN TEXT:

MR. MINISTER:

- I

TODAY I WILL RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION
OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, WHICH REMAINS UNRESOLVED IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS.

- II

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT CRUISE MISSILE RANGE
SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE
RANGE. ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED AN
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AGREED STATEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH ARTICLE III OF THE
PROTOCOL SETTING FORTH THE CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL RANGE, WHICH PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A SATIS-
FACTORY RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

THE APPROACH TAKEN BY THE SOVIET SIDE, TO DEFINE CRUISE
MISSILE RANGE AS THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE THE MISSILE CAN FLY

IN A STRAIGHT LINE TO FUEL EXHAUSTION, IS NOT REALISTIC
IN THAT IT IGNORES THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CRUISE MISSILES--
IN PARTICULAR, THAT THEY DO NOT GENERALLY FLY IN A STRAIGHT
LINE TO THEIR TARGETS.

- III

HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE
SOVIET SIDE REGARDING THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE A REVISED APPROACH WHICH SHOULD
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES.

UNDER THIS APPROACH, THE AGREED STATEMENT PROPOSED BY
THE UNITED STATES TO DEFINE CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WOULD BE
SUPPLEMENTED BY AN ADDITIONAL AGREED UNDERSTANDING. THIS
UNDERSTANDING WOULD PROVIDE THAT A CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOP-
ED AND TESTED FOR ENGAGING TARGETS OTHER THAN SHIPS WILL
BE CONSIDERED TO BE CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE
RELEVANT RANGE LIMITATION OF THE TREATY OR PROTOCOL EITHER
IF IT HAS A MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE IN EXCESS OF
THAT RANGE LIMITATION, OR IF IT CAN COVER A DISTANCE
GREATER THAN AN AGREED PERCENTAGE IN EXCESS OF THAT RANGE
LIMITATION WHEN OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM
DESIGN MODE. THIS DISTANCE WOULD BE MEASURED ALONG THE
PROJECTION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE'S FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE
EARTH'S SPHERE FROM POINT OF LAUNCH TO POINT OF IMPACT,
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AND WOULD NOT INCLUDE THE ADDITIONAL DISTANCE WHICH THE
MISSILE THEORETICALLY COULD FLY IF IT USED ITS FUEL
RESERVE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS APPROACH STANDARD FULL-
SYSTEM DESIGN MODE WOULD REFER TO THE NORMAL FLIGHT PRO-
FILE OF THE CRUISE MISSILE, THAT IS, ITS NORMAL ALTITUDE
AND SPEED.

THE PERCENTAGE ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE
PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THE FACT THAT MODERN CRUISE MISSILES ARE DESIGNED TO
MANEUVER HORIZONTALLY IN TRAVELING TO THEIR TARGETS, BUT
IT WOULD AT THE SAME TIME PLACE A FINITE LIMIT ON THE
MAXIMUM DISTANCE A CRUISE MISSILE CAN COVER.

IN ADDITION, CRUISE MISSILES, LIKE ALL AERODYNAMIC
VEHICLES, NEED TO CARRY A REASONABLE RESERVE OF FUEL TO
MEET CONTINGENCIES. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO
INCLUDE SUCH FUEL RESERVES IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE
MAXIMUM DISTANCE WHICH CRUISE MISSILES CAN COVER.

FURTHER, CRUISE MISSILES DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR
ANTI-SHIP MISSIONS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THIS APPROACH, SINCE

THOSE SYSTEMS HAVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND RESULTING CHARACTERISTICS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER CRUISE MISSILES. IN THE CASE OF ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES, ONLY THE CRITERION OF MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE WOULD APPLY.

- IV

MR. MINISTER, THE APPROACH THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED TODAY PROVIDES A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR RESOLVING

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 09033

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THE ISSUE OF THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE.
END TEXT.

2. SECOND STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR EARLE ON JUNE 14, 1978.

BEGIN TEXT:

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN TO ANOTHER MATTER, MR. MINISTER, AND COMMENT ON THAT PORTION OF YOUR STATEMENT AT THE JUNE 8 PLENARY MEETING WHICH DEALT WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRUISE MISSILE RANGE LIMITATIONS IN THE PROTOCOL AND THE TREATY.

YOU STATED THAT "TO INTRODUCE INTO THE TEXT OF THE TREATY A PROVISION SPECIFYING A DIFFERENT, HIGHER LIMIT FOR CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WOULD IN FACT MEAN THAT IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD, IN PARTIC-

ULAR, CONCERN THE QUESTIONS INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL, IT
WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THE PERMITTED MAXIMUM CRUISE
MISSILE RANGE AS COMPARED TO THE UPPER LIMIT OF 2500 KILO-
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METERS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THREE YEARS." THIS PART OF
YOUR STATEMENT TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT WAS PRE-
SENTED CARRIES THE IMPLICATION THAT EITHER 2500 KILOMETERS
OR A LOWER RANGE WILL NECESSARILY BE THE MAXIMUM PERMIT-
TED CRUISE MISSILE RANGE AFTER THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL
EXPIRES.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT ACCEPT THIS PRESUMPTION.
AS YOU KNOW, THE CRUISE MISSILE RANGE LIMITATIONS IN THE
PROTOCOL HAVE BEEN AGREED ONLY FOR THE TERM OF THE PROTO-
COL, AND ARE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PROTOCOL ESTABLISH NO PRECEDENT FOR THE PERIOD BEYOND THE
TERM OF THE PROTOCOL. END TEXT. EARLE

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